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Notes on its 
substance and 
methodology 
Lars Inge 1st am* 
In its article the author reviews a number of the main 
problems posed by long-range development plan-
ning and outlines his own views concerning them. 
He starts out by discussing the political aspects of 
planning and stresses that planning is part of a 
power-based decision-making process
 t in which 
decision-makers' mental images play an important 
role. His examination of the relationship between 
planning and the market in mixed economies leads 
into a discussion of the "planning object" which, in 
the author's opinion, should be regarded as a "multi-
organization" composed of enterprises, political 
bodies, social organizations and movements, etc. In 
exploring the concept of the planning object, he 
identifies various types of economies (élite, formal 
and total) and the problems posed by each. 
In the concluding sections, some ethical and 
methodological questions are discussed. One of the 
ethical issues that is stressed is the responsibility of 
planners to future generations, who will be signifi-
cantly affected by their decisions. The methodologi-
cal aspects referred to include, inter alia, economic 
accounting, the construction of models, scenario-
building and levels of analysis. 
•Professor of Technology and Social Change at the 
University of Linkoping, Stockholm, Sweden. 
The functions of planning 
"If planning is everything, maybe 
it's nothing" (Aaron Wildawsky) 
Planning is basically preparing for decisions. 
Decisions of any significance are based on 
power. Hence planning ts par.t of the exercise of 
power in society. No methodology or philosophy 
of planning should be allowed to hide this fact. It 
is widely recognized in the social sciences that 
societal functions, such as planning, cannot stray 
far from what is acceptable to those holding 
power if it is to remain "relevant". Planning for 
desirable social change may well be important, 
but it is by necessity severely limited as an instru-
ment of such change. Nonetheless, its range of 
action may yet be great enough to make the 
effort worthwhile! 
Long-range planning is part of the exercise 
of power over the future. This has methodologi-
cal implications, such as the use of systematic 
futures studies and the relativization of some 
economic variables (e.g., GNP growth). The 
longer time frame also has some ethical implica-
tions, apart from those pertaining to planning or 
decision-making in general. In addition, the nor-
mative element in planning becomes clear, and 
the question of desired social change comes to 
the forefront. If it is not taken seriously, the 
function of long-range planning may simply be 
to make "all that is wrong grow worse more 
consistently". 
In planning, the mental images held by 
decision-makers and planners are more impor-
tant than specific methodologies. They guide the 
formulation of plans, including forecasting and 
scenario-building. Such mental images are 
essentially of two kinds: mental legacies from 
past experience, and images of the future. In 
"unproblematic" times these images are mostly 
implicit; moreover, the picture of the future 
seems to conform nicely to past experiences. In 
times of crisis, the opposite holds true. History, 
as well as the future, appears controversial and, 
sometimes, threating. At such times, an impor-
tant function of long-range planning and futures 
studies is to make explicit these two sets of 
images and to challenge them by presenting 
alternative ways of structuring known facts, new 
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facts and non-standard courses of action. 
This does not mean that planning should 
have only a dialectical and critical function in 
regard to the political system (in the broadest 
possible sense). Any planning process, be it for a 
firm, a nation or a whole region, has to find out 
and define what kind of issue it really has to 
address. Experience shows that the most impor-
tant function of planning, in retrospect, has 
almost always been the effort to sort out the 
"basic issues" from all other concerns. 
The "longer" time frame involves an intel-
lectual challenge. Focussing on the future raises 
more fundamental and strategic questions than 
are usually encountered in politics or administra-
tion. For the intellectual, this is a chance to bring 
in basic theoretical questions from the social 
sciences, history and philosophy and to set day-
to-day events within a broader perspective. It 
also frees the researcher from the tediousness of 
empirical data, as well as from the need to adhere 
to strict disciplinary boundaries. For once, one is 
allowed to explore "the great paradigms which 
seek to explain the social dynamic". Experience 
shows that this, to a large extent, is a useful 
stimulus to the social sciences as well as to 
The superposition of the two terms "planning" 
and "market economy" (in particular if the latter 
is taken to mean that economic decisions are 
decentralized) seem at first glance to be logically 
contradictory. This is, of course, not quite so: all 
known contemporary economies are "mixed" to 
some extent and contain elements of (central) 
planning. Nonetheless, the question is indeed 
problematic and ideologically controversial. If 
one thinks of planning as primarily having to do 
with "public policies", the experience of 
advanced mixed economies leads one to identify 
three types of interrelations between planning 
and the market: 
a) Counter-market: interventions directed 
mainl at redistribution, the cutting of profits, 
rules concerning emplacement, environmental 
serious political debate: "developing and apply-
ing knowledge and intelligence in our affairs" 
(Barnard). 
On the other hand, it also entails a political 
temptation. It will always be difficult for consid-
erations based on a longer time frame to have an 
impact on the day-to-day practice of politics. The 
limitations in handling capacity are felt every-
where. When "future" issues are taken up 
explictly, however, the political apparatus may 
be tempted to regard these considerations as 
delegated to "planners", future studies organiza-
tions or the like, instead of integrating them at 
least to some extent into its own thinking. 
I suggest the use of a basic conceptual model 
for the analysis of planning problems. It 
involves, first, the identification of three ele-
ments: a planning subject, which is the person or 
organization that plans; a planning object, 
which is what the planning is directed towards; 
and the environment, denoting everything that 
cannot be planned for but that has importance 
for the planning object and for the issues with 
which the planning is concerned. This model 
will be used to structure some of the reflections 
on development planning that follow. 
restrictions, increased employment, worker pro-
tection, etc. 
i b) Pro-market: interventions intended to 
r restore a more ideal market, i.e., to wipe the slate 
I clean and start afresh (anti-trust legislation 
> would be one example). At times, a more 
i advanced form of this is practiced which consists 
I of giving added thrust to market forces, thus 
F speeding them along in the direction they are 
) supposed to go (e.g., government research 
F subsidies). 
r c) Management of activities in the public 
; sector, which are hence outside the market and 
in principle already under political control. 
1 There is of course no way to neatly group 
various policies into one or the other category; in 
1 monetary policy, for instance, a) and b) tend to 
II 
Planning and the market 
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appear in some sort of mixture, and in fiscal 
policy all three are present. Transportation sub-
sidies can be either or both, and so on. Interven-
tions of type a) are often legitimized by claiming 
that they are really b), pro-market, in the long 
run. It is also quite frequent for actors who sup-
port an ideal, free market "in principle" to argue 
for type a) interventionist policies in favour of 
special interests. 
From a methodological point of view, how-
ever, the distinction is an important one. The 
most productive planning experiences in the 
public policy domain refer to type c) in sectors 
such as defence, education, social services, trans-
portation, etc. There are two reasons for this. 
Firstly, in these fields there are considerable 
similarities with the private company, which is 
by far the kind of unit most "planned for" and 
one whose planning problems have been widely 
elaborated in the literature. Secondly, in spite of 
political uncertainties and forecasting problems, 
it is far easier to "decide in advance" in these 
areas than for the country or the economy at 
large. This has led to a situation in which many 
planning methodologies, sometimes without 
explicitly recognizing it, refer to such largely 
controllable planning objects. 
The real question of planning for develop-
ment is far more difficult, even methodologi-
cally. What is the planning object! Certainly not 
only the State or the public sector. The planning 
object might preferably be described as a multi-
organization whose major components, apart 
from the political organs proper, are private 
companies (large and small), associations of 
firms, labour unions, popular movements, the 
bureaucracy and the intelligentsia. The strength 
The question "What is the planning object?" can 
also be answered: "the economy". However, ít is 
not at all trivial to ask what one means by "econ-
omy" in a development perspective. In addition, 
the analysis should include economic and social 
factors. Even if one assumes that the economy is 
a basic determinant of social development, the 
and importance of these actors vary, of course, 
from country to country. Conflicts, more or less 
fundamental, exist among them. The question of 
how to "plan" for a reasonable development of 
such multi-organizations has been solved in 
many different ways in mixed economies: they 
are reflected in such different schemes as Le Plan 
in France, the three-modal planning structure in 
the Netherlands and the indicative, mainly eco-
nomic, planning in the author's own country, 
Sweden. In all three of these countries a need has 
also been felt to organize futures studies with a 
broader scope, but with correspondingly looser 
ties to real decision-making. In a mixed econ-
omy, intervention by the "management" has to 
be more limited than in a firm or an office. In 
many cases it is also politically sensitive. These 
facts cannot be separated from "methodologies" 
for planning, nor from what have been described 
above as the "issues". 
In many countries (development) planning 
has come to be identified with the elaboration of 
econometric models of the economy and the 
projection of development some years (three, 
five or sometimes more) into the future. Many 
countries and international agencies which pro-
vide development assistance —beginning with 
the United States and the Marshall Plan for the 
reconstruction of Europe after 1945— require 
that the recipients establish this kind of plan-
ning model. The indicative value of such models 
is not denied. They evidently go some way 
towards solving the governmental dilemma out-
lined further on in this article. However, as a tool 
for truly long-range development planning, such 
models are very limited and to some extent also 
misleading. 
conceptualization of economic factors, in the 
long run, becomes crucial as regards the type of 
social issues that can be recognized and analysed. 
Again, three levels of delimitation can be 
distinguished. I will call them, respectively, the 
élite, the formal and the /o/a/economies. A lead-
ing value for most national economies for sev-
III 
Beyond "the economy" 
72 CEPAL REVIEW No. 31 / April 1987 
eral decades has been "export-led growth" (the 
Latin American countries have, since colonial 
times, been marked by a very clear, and at times 
excessive, export dependence). It is natural that 
this mental legacy still plays a very strong part in 
development thinking. Methodologically, this is 
reflected in a strong emphasis on the "élite", or 
"modern" part of the economy and its growth 
potential. Econometric models and formally-
registered GNP growth tend to overestimate the 
overall importance of the élite economy. 
Aside from modelling and statistics, there 
seems to be a critical assumption tied to the 
emphasis placed on the élite economy, namely 
that through some "trickle-down" process, 
healthy growth in the élite economy also will 
raise the economic standards for the whole pop-
ulation proportionally or nearly so. In the 
debates on growth in the countries of Northern 
Europe, proponents of this position have often 
retreated to the weaker statement that a higher 
standard for all is possible on a higherGNP level. 
In Latin America, even this hypothesis seems to 
be unsupported by facts. Hence no simple and 
direct linkage can be assumed between the per-
formance of the élite economy and more general 
social and economic goals. 
However, within the bounds of standard 
accounting and modelling procedures, the 
behaviour of the full formal (money-based) 
economy may in principle be taken into account. 
In the European economies, full accounting of 
the formal economy, as observed either from the 
side of expenditures or from production, is nor-
mal practice. It might be supposed that in some 
Latin American countries statistical reporting is 
not complete enough for a reliable account of, for 
example, small businesses, particularly in the 
countryside. It seems clear, however, that des-
criptions of the full formal economy, in model-
based form or otherwise, can give important 
information on such variables as wage levels in 
the non-élite sectors and the cost of living. 
An account of the economy that is complete 
enough to allow analysis of changes in living 
standards for the whole population must also 
include the informal (unpaid) economy. This 
includes work done in households, subsistence 
farming, crafts, repairs and maintenance outside 
the market, and co-operative work (e.g., at the 
village level). If we add this to the formal econ-
omy we arrive at the total economy. Some devel-
oping countries exhibit a very sharp duality in 
their economies —essentially between the élite 
sector and the rest of the economy— and in these 
cases the importance of the informal sector is 
readily recognized. However, the informal part 
of the economy does not wither away as coun-
tries become more developed or the GNP rises. 
In the industrialized countries of Northern 
Europe, typically as much labour time is spent in 
informal work as in paid employment. This, 
however, holds on the aggregate level; the allo-
cation of the total amount of work is an impor-
tant indicator of the lifestyles and well-being of 
the population. (There is a tendency for a new 
duality to develop in some of the industrialized 
economies of Europe which is coupled with 
growing mass unemployment. Hence dualiza-
tion may turn out to be a companion not only of 
underdevelopment but of overdevelopment as 
well.) 
For obvious reasons, the statistical reporting 
from the informal sector is markedly inferior to 
that of the élite sector. Of course I am not sug-
gesting that a full system of national statistics of, 
say, hours spent in various forms of informal 
work, should be set up. One reason for not doing 
so is that such a scheme would be impractical, 
and in large measure impossible. Another has to 
do with ethics and the rights of the State: the 
point of informal work and informal exchange is 
precisely their property of being informal, i.e., 
unregulated and unregistered. Reporting 
requirements would in many cases be unnatural 
and, in some cases, would actually destroy what 
they were supposed to measure. 
However, a basic knowledge about the infor-
mal economy in broad terms is neccesary for 
reasonable planning. This would have to be 
acquired through research on typical cases and 
important examples; some results could also be 
obtained by indirect means from known data. 
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IV 
Ethical dilemmas 
In long-range planning the time span involved 
frequently covers several generations. This 
poses the ethical question squarely: Who is 
responsible for what we leave —in terms of 
natural resources, environment, infrastructure, 
production capacity, etc.— to coming genera-
tions'! The Swedish commission concerned with 
future studies, under Alva Myrdals chairman-
ship, formulated an answer: "In our democratic 
society, it is the task of the political bodies to 
represent the interests of coming generations". 
This may sound idealistic and/or unrealistic to 
some, What cannot be discounted, however, is 
the ethical challenge of the question. Using a 
purely economistic methodology, some have 
claimed that an appropriate interest rate is the 
proper instrument to balance the (material, eco-
nomic) claims of coming generations against 
those of us living today. This position does not 
stand up to a closer ethical analysis when applied 
to such problems as the depletion of natural 
resources or the permanent use of fertile land for 
other purposes. The dilemma remains, and some 
explicit ethical reflection should, in my view, 
Economic accounting and model-building will 
no doubt be the backbone of development plan-
ning even in the future. I have already voiced my 
concern that this may lead to an over-emphasis 
on the formal economy, and in particular the 
élite and export-oriented segments of it. One 
might go a step further and ask whether the 
exactness and the prestige of quantitative eco-
nomic exercises may overstress the economic 
indicators of development, overshadowing other 
dimensions that are often more difficult to quan-
tify and measure. 
Scenario-building has become an important 
tool for exploring long-range issues in many 
countries. Through broad descriptions of "future 
always accompany long-range planning which 
affects coming generations. 
One might think that long-range planning 
and reflections about the future is something 
that one can choose to do —or not to do. This is 
of course so: there is no immediate need to plan 
ahead, and I know of no constitution that 
requires the government to take the more dis-
tant future into account. This does not mean, 
however, that long-range problems do not exist. 
A vast number of decisions, taken on all kinds of 
levels in the multi-organization which is modern 
society, serve to create the future. It is like a 
zipper that gradually closes. Small decisions, 
adjustments, legislation and habits create a 
legacy, and later —when the future does not look 
so bright any more, or when an initially promis-
ing course has led to an impasse— the nation 
finds itself zipped into something which feels 
rather like a straightjacket. There is, in my view, 
an ethical element even in this situation. Some 
organized thinking about the dilemmas that are 
created by the "terror of small decisions" should 
be the responsibility of every government. 
histories", i.e., a small number of qualitatively 
different alternatives, one can achieve an under-
standing which cuts across sectoral boundaries. 
Alternative courses of action (and not only those 
elaborated in the study) are then more likely to 
occur to decision-makers. The planning context, 
in general a multi-organization, makes it manda-
tory for planning to take the form of dialogue 
and negotiation. Scenarios have proved to playa 
clarifying and disciplining role in that process. 
Particularly those scenarios that contain a "hard 
core" of economic data or an economic model, 
but which also include a broader set of variables, 
have turned out to be useful in understanding 
development problems. (A famous example 
V 
Methodology: concluding remarks 
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from the modern literature is the Bariloche study 
Catastrophe or New Society? by A. Herrera et 
at., 1977.) 
A multitude of futures studies and long-
range planning "methods" have been offered by 
consultancies, institutes and university groups. 
Taking the risk of sounding grossly unfair, I 
would like to issue a general warning against 
packaged, "over-the-counter" methodologies. 
The major reason for this lies in the hidden 
When the problem is approached from the 
standpoint of planning methodologies, some 
critical factors having to do with the nature of 
the development process and its goals emerge 
with particular clarity. I will discuss three of 
them, very briefly. 
All development processes have two sides: 
the creation/mobilization of resources, and their 
allocation/consumption/distribution. There are 
also (at least) two possible levels of analysis: 
macro and micro. If stress is laid on the macro 
level only, "growth" is seen as a rather mechani-
cal phenomenon, and the more interesting 
aspects of resource mobilization, particularly 
that of human labour, tend to be overlooked. In 
economies that show tendencies towards duality, 
the micro aspects of mobilizing manpower, land 
and other resources should be given particular 
attention. 
It is natural that transition theories of the 
kind that have been discussed in the United 
States and Europe should be taken into consider-
ation; they are marked by terms such as "post-
industrial society", "service society", 
"information society", "self-service society", and 
so on. In the first place, one should again be 
assumptions about "the issues" that are always 
built into ready-made models. Until such time as 
the decision-maker and the planner are con-
vinced that a specific methodology conforms 
reasonably well to the problems to be explored, 
they should not subscribe to a certain methodol-
ogy. This position —problem before method— 
is a subjective and disputed one, but I argue for it 
based on my experience and the existing litera-
ture. 
warned against the mechanical application of 
observed statistical regularities. For certain 
groups of countries, the rise of GNP is accom-
panied by a very clear shift in labour, first away 
from agriculture into industry and then from 
industry into services. The driving forces may 
well not be the same in the Latin American 
economies, and the theoretical assumptions on 
which the future projections of such develop-
ments are based may not necessarily be fulfilled. 
For one thing, most theories of transition 
assume that wage levels across the whole econ-
omy are comparable and that they move essen-
tially in parallel. If this is not the case, the whole 
picture will change. 
It is logical to believe that, rather than des-
cribing a typical Latin American economy in 
terms of one transition (such as "industrial" to 
"service"), one should look at it as at least three 
transitions superimposed on one another: from 
agricultural to industrial, from industrial goods 
to industrialized information, and from goods to 
services, part of the latter being in the "self-
service" mode. In this way, some of the major 
transition theories can be put to use without 
incurring their extreme and unrealistic 
simplifications. 
VI 
The issues 
